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1 Introduction
Structured financial products have gained a large popularity in many countries in the
last years. In 2007, a volume of 100 billion USD has been issued in the USA, and
in Germany even 200 billion Euro have been reached. Yearly growth rates (at least
before the financial crisis) have been in the order of 30%, and structured products
are quickly becoming a standard form of investment for private investors. Their suc-
cess sometimes challenges traditional financial models but can often be explained by
behavioral theories that take effects like loss aversion into account.
On the other hand, many banks have understood today that selling separate finan-
cial products is not the best way to achieve an overall optimal portfolio for the client,
since it does not consider correlations between different products in the client’s port-
folio. Therefore an integrated wealth management that optimizes the overall portfolio
of a client or offers a tailor-made collection of assets and structured products is more
and more frequently offered. A systematic approach to this optimization that takes
into account potential behavioral biases of the client is therefore of high importance.
In this article we lay the theoretical foundation of such a systematic approach for
wealth management and study properties that an optimized portfolio should have. We
consider this in the framework of structured products, where we assume that the to-
tal wealth of the client is invested into this structured product and there is hence no
background risk to be hedged. We impose only the mildest possible conditions on the
preferences of the client. In particular we do not assume that the client will want to
optimize its investment according to mean–variance theory or to the rational frame-
work of expected utility theory, but we allow explicitly for other decision models,
e.g., behavioral models like prospect theory. We also allow for “benchmarking,” i.e.,
for variable reference points that are set, for instance, by some index (like a stock
market index), as well as for decision models based on the total return.
One main result of our work is that even in this general setting certain properties
of an optimal financial product are always present (Theorem 2.12). In particular, we
show that optimal products “follow the market,” i.e., they are co-monotone with the
market portfolio (in the case of a CAPM market or Black–Scholes pricing) or with
the reversed state price density (in the general case). This result has immediate conse-
quences for the design of financial products in the context of wealth management, and
we use it to develop a new method for finding optimal investments. Another main re-
sult of our work is an existence theorem for such optimal investments (Theorem 3.1).
Let us have a closer look at the model we are studying. We consider complete
and efficient financial markets in which all market participants have homogenous
beliefs and act according to a maximization of their utility. The main focus of this
article lies on the question what properties a financial product on such a market has
to satisfy if it is optimal in the sense that it maximizes a given utility of an investor.
Before we make this question more precise, we first review some properties of such
markets (compare, e.g., [8] for details and [2] for generalizations). First, we need
a general pricing formula. One obtains such a formula based on the assumption of
no-arbitrage. A precise derivation can be found, e.g., in the book by Le Roy and
Werner [21, Chap. 20]. We give a short heuristic below.
Let the return distribution of an asset be given by the probability measure p on
R, let the state price density be π , and let their mean and variance be given by E(p),
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E(π) and var(p), var(π), respectively. (In this article we interpret probability mea-
sures on the space of possible returns often as random variables by identifying the
sample space with the space of possible returns.) Let R be the return of the risk-free
asset (i.e., the interest rate or risk-free rate). Then we can derive from a suitable no-
arbitrage condition that all financial products that are available for a fixed price (for
simplicity, we set this price to one) and that can be described by a joint probability
measure T on Rm × Rn such that p = ∫
R
dT (·, y) and π = ∫
R
dT (x, ·) satisfy the
constraint
E(p) − R = −βpπ
(
E(π) − R), where βpπ = covT
var(π)
. (1.1)
Heuristically, this formula can be understood in terms of risk factors. Then π is the
risk of an investment in a given situation. The returns of the asset p above the risk-
free rate are then approximated by a linear regression with π , and βpπ is the slope of
this linear approximation, i.e., the regression coefficient. Alternatively, one can think
of π(x) as the price for a fixed payoff in state x. If x corresponds to the market return
at maturity, then payoffs in states with low market return will be more expensive,
and thus we expect π to be decreasing in x. For a rigorous derivation of (1.1), see
[21, Chap. 20].
We make henceforth the general assumption that the state prices are nonnegative
(compare [8]), which corresponds to assuming that the preferences of the market
participants are weakly monotonic. An optimal product is defined as a product that
maximizes a given utility subject to condition (1.1). The utility could here be given
according to expected utility theory, prospect theory, or a different model, depending
on the application one has in mind.
We define the reversed state price density π˜ by π˜(E(π) + x) := π(E(π) − x).
It has been observed in the literature that in certain cases an optimal asset is co-
monotone to π˜ . (We give a precise definition of co-monotonicity in Sect. 2.1.) This
is similar to a classical result in the context of Pareto efficiency, see, e.g., [20] and
[21, Sect. 15.5], and has been generalized by a very simple and neat result of Dyb-
vig [9] to optimal portfolio design in the case of finite state spaces with equal prob-
ability for each state and an expected utility maximizer. He states that then “any
cheapest way to achieve a lottery assigns the outcomes of the lottery to the states in
reverse order of the state price density”, in other words that an optimal portfolio and
the reversed state price density are co-monotone. He also mentions that “the analysis
still works when probabilities are unequal if we assume that agents are risk averse”
[9, p. 389]. Furthermore, he suggests a generalization to a nonexpected utility set-
ting of Machina preferences [22] and to continuous state spaces with nonatomic state
prices. (A proof for the latter extension in the case of a strictly concave utility can be
found in [11, Chap. 3].)
Dybvig presents interesting applications of co-monotonicity on dynamic portfolio
strategies in a follow-up paper [10], but no additional results on co-monotonicity
are derived there. A first generalization of co-monotonicity results to markets with
frictions has been given by Jouini and Kallal [14] for finite state spaces and by Jouini
and Porte [17] for arbitrary state spaces, in both cases under the assumption of a
concave utility function. The concept of co-monotonicity has also been applied to
insurance risks by Dhaene et al. [7] and by Carlier and Dana [4, 5].
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In this article we generalize the observation of Dybvig [9] in a mathematically
rigorous way into four directions:
1. We remove the restriction of equal probabilities for the states (without adding
additional assumptions on the preferences).
2. We give a rigorous generalization to arbitrary state spaces, without assuming con-
cavity of the utility function or nonatomic measures. In fact, we study general
probability measures on the infinite state space of returns (i.e., the real numbers).
3. Instead of considering only expected utility theory, we allow for arbitrary decision
models for investors without background risk, compare Definition 2.11.1
4. We allow for “benchmarking,” i.e., the investor’s utility may depend on a variable
reference point, e.g., the market index (see Sect. 2.5).
Our results are based on general mathematical methods for transport plans (compare
Ambrosio [1]), which we summarize in Sect. 2.1 of this article. We need to rely
on this result since rearrangement techniques (going back to Hardy, Littlewood, and
Pólya [12] and later applied in [5] and [3]) generally require nonatomic marginals.
We apply these mathematical results in Sect. 2.2 to derive general conditions under
which the outcome distribution of an optimal financial product is co-monotone with
the reversed state price density. It turns out that this property is much more universal
than had been anticipated. We discuss special cases in Sect. 2.3–2.5, in particular
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and prices according to the Black–Scholes
model. We extend a variant of the two-fund-separation theorem to the case of general
preferences.
The co-monotonicity result opens the path for a new approach to the design of
optimal financial products, which is based not on the optimization of asset alloca-
tions, but instead of a direct optimization of the underlying return distribution. This
approach is explained in Sect. 3.1, and new existence results for optimal financial
products are derived. Since this optimization idea extends the set of admissible in-
vestments substantially, the optimization cannot rely on classical methods but needs
to invoke results from nonlinear analysis. We briefly sketch some numerical methods
for the computation of such optimal products in Sect. 3.2. There are, however, limita-
tions to this approach, which provide interesting insights into the shortfalls of pricing
formulas based on the no-arbitrage condition. These limitations will be discussed in
Sect. 3.3.
We conclude this article by a practical application, namely the study of bonus
certificates (Sect. 4). We demonstrate that these products are not optimal and can be
improved by a monotonizing procedure that can be performed explicitly.
2 Co-monotonicity
In this section we present some of our main results. We start out from a mathematical
analysis of joint probability measures in Sect. 2.1. The mathematically less inclined
1In particular, there is no need to assume a strictly concave utility maximization, contrary to the traditional
intuition to co-monotonicity that one might get from the equivalence between state price density and
marginal rate of substitution [20].
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reader might skip this section and continue with Sect. 2.2 at first reading, relying on
the intuitive idea that joint probability measures that minimize (or maximize) certain
quantities are co-monotone, which means roughly that the probability measures that
are connected via the joint probability measure “follow” each other: a larger outcome
of one of them always corresponds to a larger outcome of the other and vice versa.
In Sect. 2.2 we apply these results to the study of optimal financial products and
prove that such optimal products are co-monotone with the reversed state price den-
sity under general conditions. In Sects. 2.3–2.5, we study special cases of this general
statement which are of particular interest.
2.1 Co-monotonicity of joint probability distributions
The main mathematical tool that we apply in this article is the so-called “trans-
port theory.” This theory originally dealt with optimizing transports of soil, e.g., in
construction or mining, and goes back to the 18th century when the French mathe-
matician Monge [24] introduced the first version of this problem. Major progress on
this problem has been achieved in the 1940s with the seminal work by the Russian
economist and mathematician Kantorovich [19]. We state his formulation for the one-
dimensional case that is of particular interest for our purpose.
Definition 2.1 (Transport problem) Let μ ∈ P(Rm), ν ∈ P(Rn) (i.e., probability
measures on Rm and Rn), and let c : Rm × Rn → R be a lower semi-continuous
function (the cost function). Then the transport problem consists of finding a joint
probability measure T ∈ P(Rm × Rn) which minimizes
C(T ) :=
∫
Rm
∫
Rn
c(x, y) dT (x, y) (2.1)
and such that the marginals of T are given by μ and ν, i.e., pr1T = μ,pr2T = ν,
where pr1 is the projection on the first m coordinates, and pr2 the projection on the
last n coordinates, i.e.,
pr1T :=
∫
Rm
dT (·, y), pr2T :=
∫
Rn
dT (x, ·).
At the optimum, the mass μ is transported to ν for least cost according to the
transport plan T . It is well known that the above transport problem admits a solution,
see [1, Sect. 2].
Before we continue, we have to define the following useful notation.
Definition 2.2 (Push forward) Let n ∈ N, and let f : Rn → Rn be a measurable func-
tion, and μ a measure on Rn. Then we define the push forward f#μ by
(f#μ)(B) := μ
(
f −1(B)
)
for all Borel sets B ⊂ Rn.
In other words, f #μ = μ ◦ f −1 is simply the image measure of μ under f .
The central property we use in this article is co-monotonicity. We present first a
one-dimensional formulation, before we generalize to c-monotonicity.
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Definition 2.3 (Co-monotonicity of joint probability measures) Let T ∈ P(R,R)
be a joint probability measure with marginals μ,ν ∈ P(R). Then T is called co-
monotone if for all (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ supp T with x2 > x1, we have y2 ≥ y1. (We
also sometimes say that μ and ν are co-monotone.)
It is easy to see that this property can be expressed equivalently as a monotonicity
property as follows:
Remark 2.4 T is co-monotone if and only if it satisfies the following condition: For
all Borel sets A,B ⊂ R with μ(A) > 0,μ(B) > 0, and infB > supA, we define
A′ := supp pr2(T |A×R), B ′ := supp pr2(T |B×R).
Then infB ′ ≥ supA′.
Co-monotonicity hence means than that one marginal “follows” the other: the
larger the outcome of one, the larger the outcome of the other (and vice versa). The
definition of co-monotonicity is a natural extension of the usual notion of monotonic-
ity in the following sense.
Proposition 2.5 Let T be a joint probability measure with marginals μ and ν. If T
can be interpreted as a map that maps the measure μ pointwise to ν, then T is co-
monotone if this map is monotone as a function on R. More precisely, if there exists
a map T˜ : suppμ → R such that T = (Id × T˜ )#μ, then T is co-monotone iff T˜ is
μ-a.e. monotone.2
Proof It is straightforward to prove that suppT satisfies the condition of Defini-
tion 2.3 if and only if T˜ is monotone. 
In the higher-dimensional case we introduce the following:
Definition 2.6 (c-monotonicity) Let T ∈ P(Rm ×Rn) be a joint probability measure
from Rm to Rn, and let c : Rm ×Rn → R be a lower semi-continuous function. Then
T is called c-monotone if for all I ≥ 1, all (xi, yi) ∈ suppT , and all permutations σ
of the set {1,2, . . . , I }, we have
I∑
i=1
c(xi, yi) ≤
I∑
i=1
c(xi, yσ(i)).
There are extensions of this concept to time-continuous settings [15, 16], but we
do not pursue this issue in the current article, where we only study two-period models.
The central mathematical result that we apply is that solutions of transport prob-
lems under quite general conditions exist and are c-monotone [1, Theorems 2.1–2.2].
We summarize these results as follows:
2We remark that it is necessary to allow T˜ to be nonmonotone on a set N with μ(N) = 0, since T˜ can be
defined arbitrarily on such sets.
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Theorem 2.7 Let c : Rm × Rn → R be a lower semi-continuous function. Then the
transport problem (2.1) with marginals μ ∈ P(Rm) and ν ∈ P(Rn) admits a solution
T ∈ P(Rm × Rn) which is c-monotone.
From these fundamental results it is easy to derive the following corollary for the
case m = n = 1 which we use in the next section.3
Corollary 2.8 There exists a co-monotone minimizer T ∈ P(R × R) of the transport
problem with cost function c(x, y) = −(x − E(μ))(y − E(ν)).
Proof From Theorem 2.7 we know that there exists an optimal c-monotone T . If we
take two arbitrary points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in suppT with x2 ≥ x1, then we have
the inequality
c(x1, y1) + c(x2, y2) ≤ c(x1, y2) + c(x2, y1).
Using c(x, y) = −(x −E(μ))(y −E(ν)) and simplifying the resulting inequality, we
arrive at (x1 − x2)(y1 − y2) ≥ 0. Since x2 ≥ x1, it follows that y2 ≥ y1. Thus T is
co-monotone. 
We should like to mention that a direct proof of this result by constructing the co-
monotone joint probability measure for a discrete problem and passing to the limit is
possible but lengthy [25]. “Obvious” methods, e.g., the use of rearrangement tech-
niques or Hardy–Littlewood inequalities, unfortunately need further assumptions,
e.g., absolutely continuous marginals.
We conclude this section with a useful approximation lemma, which essentially
states that co-monotone distributions can be approximated by functions.
Lemma 2.9 Let T be a co-monotone joint probability measure with marginals μ
and ν. Then there is a sequence of co-monotone joint probability measures
Tn = (Id × ψn)#μ,
where ψn : suppμ → R are such that Tn ⇀ T .
The proof uses a standard approximation procedure and can be found, e.g., in [25].
2.2 Optimal investments: the general case
We have now all mathematical tools at hand to study co-monotonicity of financial
products. We first define the prototypical optimization problem we want to study.
Definition 2.10 (Optimal financial products) Let T ∈ P(R,R) be a joint probability
measure with the marginals pr2T = p and pr1T = π , where p is the return distribu-
tion of a financial product, and π the state price density. Let U : P(R,R) → R be a
3We come back to higher-dimensional problems in Sect. 2.6 to discuss factor models.
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function that assigns to every joint probability distribution a utility. Then we call T
optimal if it maximizes U : P(R,R) → R under the no-arbitrage condition (1.1).
In the following we restrict the class of admissible utility functions. The main un-
derlying assumptions are a “positive attitude” regarding additional returns and that
there is no background risk involved in the investment decision. These two assump-
tions are made rigorous in the following definition.
Definition 2.11 (Admissible utility functions) We call U : P(R,R) → R admissible
if (i) and one of (ii) or (ii′) hold, where the conditions are:
(i) U(T ) ≤ U(T (·, · − c)) for all c > 0.
(ii) There are a nondecreasing function h : R → R and a functional U˜ : P(R) → R
such that U(T ) = U˜(ph), where
ph(y) := pr2T
(
x, y + h(x)) =
∫
T
(
x, y + h(x))dy.4
(ii′) U depends only on the return distribution p, i.e., there is a function U˜ : R → R
such that U(T ) = U˜(pr2T ).
Condition (i) can be summarized as “more money is better”: If a financial product
is described by T , then an alternative product that is only different in that it yields
an additional sure return of c > 0 is always at least weakly preferred. Condition (ii′)
says simply that the investor’s utility only depends on the return distribution. This is
the usual case and occurs, e.g., when his utility is state-independent. Condition (ii)
seems at first glance quite restrictive; however, it is in fact a generalization of (ii′),
which we can see if we set h(y) := 0.
Before we discuss these conditions in more detail, we present the main result of
this section.
Theorem 2.12 (Co-monotonicity of general optimal financial products) Let
T ∈ P(R,R) be a joint probability measure describing a financial product, where
the marginals p := pr2T and π := pr1T of T are the return distribution and the
state price density. Let T be optimal with respect to an admissible utility function.
Then T is co-monotone with the reversed state price density π˜ , i.e., Tˆ defined by
Tˆ (x, y) := T (−x, y) is co-monotone.
It is important to notice here that we have made no assumptions on the precise form
of T and its regularity. T could (a priori!) for instance be an absolutely continuous
measure, or a finite weighted sum of Dirac measures, or generally any probability
measure. Our result, however, states that if T is optimal, it has to be of a very specific
type, namely co-monotone.
4This is a small abuse of notation but helps to make the following more readable. More precisely, we write
T (x, y + z) for the measure that assigns the value T ({(x, y) ∈ R2 : (x, y − z) ∈ A}) to the set A ⊂ R2.
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We remind the reader that we only made assumptions (i) and (ii) on the investor’s
preferences. Both include and even generalize the classical case corresponding to (i)
and (ii′). We shall see in Sect. 2.5 why this generalization is useful. For the moment,
let us see why we cannot generalize even more, in other words, why condition (ii) is
in fact needed.
Remark 2.13 If condition (ii) of Definition 2.11 is violated, the utility U could be
chosen such that joint probability measures which fail to satisfy co-monotonicity
have particularly large utility; as a trivial example, we simply define U(T ) = 1 for all
T which are not co-monotone with π˜ and U(T ) = 0 otherwise. This would obviously
satisfy condition (i), but an optimal product for U could not be co-monotone with π˜ .
We shall now prove Theorem 2.12. Afterwards we discuss important special cases
of this result. The main idea of the proof is to apply Theorem 2.7 to prove that the
covariance of T is maximized when T is co-monotone. For given p, we can then
monotonize T in a way which leaves the utility unchanged but at the same time
decreases the price of the product according to the no-arbitrage condition (1.1). The
price reduction can then be used to improve the product by adding a sure return.
Condition (i) implies that this new product has a larger utility. We conclude that an
optimal T is co-monotone. To make this idea work by only using condition (ii) and
not adding any assumptions to the state-price density π˜ will be the main task of the
proof where we need the mathematical results of Sect. 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.12 Let p ∈ P , and let T ∈ P(R × R) be a joint probability mea-
sure with marginals p and π˜ that maximizes the covariance, i.e.,
covT = max{covT |T ∈ P(R × R), pr2T = E(p), pr1T = E(π˜)
}
. (2.2)
We prove that T is co-monotone. First, we reformulate the problem (2.2) as a trans-
port problem, i.e., we want to find T ∈ P(R × R) minimizing
C(T ) :=
∫
R
∫
R
c(x, y) dT (x, y)
such that pr2T = p, pr1T = π˜ , where
c(x, y) := −(x − E(p))(y − E(π˜)). (2.3)
Due to Corollary 2.8, we can assume that the minimizing T , i.e., the T with the
largest covariance, is co-monotone. In other words, we have found a joint probability
measure that maximizes the covariance, given its marginals, and is co-monotone.
Suppose now that T is a joint probability measure that maximizes the utility but is
not co-monotone. Denoting T h(x, y) := T (x, y + h(x)), we compute
covT =
∫
R
∫
R
(
x − E(π˜))(y − E(p))dT (x, y)
=
∫
R
∫
R
(
x − E(π˜))(y + h(x) − E(p))dT h(x, y)
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= covT h +
∫
R
∫
R
(
x − E(π˜))h(x)dT h(x, y)
= covT h +
∫
R
(
x − E(π˜))h(x)dπ˜(x).
We use ph = pr2T h and pr1T = pr1T h = π˜ . We can maximize covT without chang-
ing the marginals of T h by maximizing covT h, since only the first term in the above
equation depends on T h, whereas the second term only depends on T h via π˜ which
is fixed. Applying our above derivation, we see that covT h can be maximized by
monotonizing T h. We call the resulting co-monotone joint probability measure T˜ h
and denote T˜ h(x, y − h(x)) by T˜ . Since U(T ) depends only on pr2T h, the util-
ity is unchanged, i.e., U(T ) = U(T˜ ). The covariance, however, has increased, i.e.,
cov T˜ > covT , since otherwise T h would have been already co-monotone; but then
T would have been co-monotone as well, since h is by assumption a monotone func-
tion. We define
d := R + E(π˜) − R
var(π˜)
cov T˜ − E(p).
Since p satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (1.1), we have
R + E(π˜) − R
var(π˜)
covT − E(p) = 0,
and therefore d > 0. Now define a new product S ∈ P(R × R) by
S(x, y) := T˜ (x, y − d).
Then S satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (1.1), and its utility is by assumption (i)
larger than the utility of T˜ . Hence U(S) > U(T˜ ) = U(T ), and therefore T cannot be
an optimal financial product. Thus every maximizer has to be co-monotone. 
In the following sections we apply Theorem 2.12 to several problems, but first we
state a natural corollary that has some importance for applications [13].
Corollary 2.14 (Payoff function) Let the likelihood ratio 	 be a nonincreasing func-
tion of the market return. Then under the assumptions of Theorem 2.12, every optimal
structured product can be written a.e. as a function of the market return (a “payoff
function”). If the market return m is a nonatomic measure, then there even exists
an optimal structured product that can be written everywhere as a (not necessarily
continuous) function.
Proof Let S ⊂ R be the set on which T cannot be represented by a function, i.e.,
S := {x ∈ R;#suppT |{x,R}>1}. The set S has measure zero on R, so if m is
nonatomic, then T has measure zero on S × R. We can therefore set T = 0 on S × R
without changing the marginals. The modified T can then be represented by a func-
tion of the market return. 
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2.3 The special cases of CAPM and Black–Scholes
A simplifying assumption on financial markets often made in applications is to equal
the reversed state price density with the market return. This is based on the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which follows from the mean–variance approach in-
troduced by Markowitz [23]. Its fundamental assumption is that every investor in the
market selects his portfolio according to mean–variance preferences, i.e., considers
only mean and variance of the assets. In such a market every investor would hold
only assets of a market portfolio and the risk-free asset, as the two-fund-separation
theorem shows. The natural question is how to invest in such a market in order to
maximize a utility function that is not necessarily of mean–variance type but, for in-
stance, follows expected utility theory. Obviously, the two-fund-separation theorem
will not hold in this case, but can we find some other general results describing opti-
mal investments?
Based on the results of the previous sections, we first state the following variant
of Theorem 2.12.
Proposition 2.15 (Co-monotonicity in CAPM markets) Every financial product on
a CAPM market (i.e., a financial market where asset prices follow the CAPM) which
is optimal for an arbitrary admissible utility has a return distribution that is co-
monotone with the market return.
Proof Note that the no-arbitrage condition (1.1) in the case of a CAPM market be-
comes
E(p) − R = βpm
(
E(m) − R), (2.4)
where βpm = cov(p,m)/var(m), and m is the market return. The market return takes
therefore the role of the reversed state price density in Theorem 2.12. 
We can now extend the two-fund-separation to the case of arbitrary admissible de-
cision models. Note that the two-fund-separation theorem implies that every product
that is optimal in the mean–variance framework has a return (adjusted by a constant
depending on the risk-free rate) which depends linearly on the market return. A prod-
uct which is optimal for an arbitrary admissible decision model does not necessarily
satisfy this, but its return depends monotonically on the market return. In other words,
we have the following result.
Theorem 2.16 (Generalized “two-fund-separation”) Consider a CAPM market.
An optimal investment for an investor with admissible utility gives a return which is
co-monotone with the market return. If the joint probability measure can be described
by a function in the sense of Proposition 2.5, this function is monotonic. If the investor
is a mean–variance maximizer, this function is affine and Rp(x) = (1−λ)R+λx with
λ ∈ R.
Proof The first part of this result is a reformulation of Proposition 2.15. The second
part simply follows from two-fund-separation: Every optimal product has a return of
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the form λx + (1 − λ)R, where x is the market return, R the risk-free rate, and λ ∈ R
the number of shares invested in the market portfolio. 
An immediate consequence of this result is that an optimal financial product
should never speculate on falling prices, since this would violate co-monotonicity.5
Finally, this result also holds in the Black–Scholes framework, since the state price
density is still a decreasing function of the market return.
Proposition 2.17 The generalized two-fund-separation also holds if we use Black–
Scholes pricing.
2.4 Performance based on the outcome
In this section we study an important special case of the results of Sect. 2.2, namely
when utility is only based on the outcome. We call an investor with such a utility a
“private investor,” since prototypical private investors would fall into this category.
We start with a precise definition what we understand by a “private investor.”
Definition 2.18 (Private investor) A private investor is described by a utility func-
tional U satisfying the following conditions:
1. The utility functional depends only on the return distribution of the investment,
i.e., U = U(p) : P(R) → R. (“Only the result matters.”)
2. If we shift the return distribution to the right, the utility increases, i.e., if the
return distribution is given by p ∈ P(R) and pc := p(· − c) for c > 0, then
U(p) < U(pc). (“The more, the better.”)
It is easy to see that a private investor’s utility function is admissible; we just have
to set h := 0 in Definition 2.11. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2.12 and obtain
the following result.
Proposition 2.19 An optimal financial product for a private investor is co-monotone
with the reversed state price density.
This implies, e.g., that for all private investors in a CAPM market, the results of
the previous section, in particular Proposition 2.15, apply, i.e., an optimal investment
should “follow the market.”
At this point it seems worthwhile to discuss how these results relate to the usual
portfolio optimization strategy that tries to identify investments which are uncorre-
lated with the market return to improve the overall performance of the portfolio. The
key differences are:
– Our first assumption implies the absence of background risk. This means that we
consider the overall investment of a person, rather than an additional position that
he might or might not add to his portfolio. Our results do not say anything about
5Recall that we have assumed homogeneous beliefs and the absence of background risk.
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the structure of such additional positions. It might even be useful for the investor
to take into his portfolio an additional position which is anti-co-monotone with the
market (e.g., by going short in an asset) in order to hedge a certain risk induced by
a different part of his portfolio.
– Another misunderstanding may arise from the word “market.” This means of
course the entirety of all possible investments, not only stocks. In particular, an
investment which is uncorrelated with the stock market is usually still correlated
with the “market” in this general sense.
– We have assumed that beliefs are homogenous and (in order to derive Proposi-
tion 2.15) that the market can be described by the CAPM or Black–Scholes model.
In reality we might profit from anomalies of the market that are not described by the
models of classical finance. For such situations, Proposition 2.15 is not applicable.
Although these limitations set a caveat on applications of our results, co-monotonicity
with the reversed state prices (or the market return if we can describe the market by
the CAPM) should still hold in practice if we do not aim to exploit market anomalies
and if we consider our investment portfolio as a whole.
In the next section we shall see that this is even the case if we do not think in
absolute returns but instead if we measure returns with respect to a benchmark index.
2.5 Performance based on a benchmark
Let us now consider the somehow opposite case of a private investor, namely an
investor whose utility only depends on the return of his investment relative to the
state price. In the case of a CAPM market, this corresponds to an investor who is
only interested in the excess return of his investment compared to the market return.
(Since this is the practically relevant case, we assume in this section a CAPM market.)
We call such an investor a “fund manager,” imagining an agent who is paid depending
on the performance of his fund with respect to the market return. More precisely, we
introduce for the case of a CAPM market
Definition 2.20 (Fund manager) A fund manager is described by a utility U satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
1. The utility depends only on the difference between the return of investment and
market, i.e., U = U(pm) : P(R) → R, where pm := pr2 T (x, y − x). In other
words, the market index is used as benchmark.
2. If we shift the return distribution to the right, the utility increases, i.e., if the re-
turn distribution is given by p ∈ P(R) and we set pc := p(· − c) for c > 0, then
U(p − m) < U(pc − m).
We can now easily see that this is just another special case of Theorem 2.12; in
fact, a fund manager’s utility is admissible so that we can choose h as identity in
Definition 2.11. Therefore, we obtain the following:
Proposition 2.21 In a CAPM market, an optimal portfolio for a fund manager has a
return distribution that is co-monotone with the market return.
40 M.O. Rieger
There is another interesting consequence of the assumptions on the preferences of
a fund manager.
Proposition 2.22 (Benchmarking leads to risky products) An optimal product for a
fund manager in a CAPM market is at least as risky as the market portfolio, i.e., the
difference between the return distribution and the market return is a nondecreasing
function of the return.
Proof This follows immediately from the co-monotonicity of the optimal T h in the
proof of Theorem 2.12. 
In the case of an investor with expected utility preferences with respect to the
market return, i.e., a utility of the form
U =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x − y)dT (x, y), (2.5)
we can strengthen the last proposition.
Proposition 2.23 A product that maximizes the utility function U in (2.5) with
u ∈ C1, u′(0) > 0 in a CAPM market must be riskier than the market portfolio, i.e.,
the difference between the return of the product and the market return is a nonde-
creasing and nonconstant function of the market return.
Proof Due to the co-monotonicity of any optimal joint probability distribution and
Lemma 2.9, it is again sufficient to consider the case where suppT is of the form
{(x,Rp(x))}. By Proposition 2.22 we already know that Rp(x) − x must be non-
decreasing. We want to show that Rp(x) − x is nonconstant. The pricing constraint
implies that Rp(x)− x can only be constant if Rp(x) = x, i.e., if the optimal product
is the market portfolio itself. Let us suppose that Rp(x) = x is optimal. Our goal is
to construct an improved product that satisfies the pricing constraint and has a higher
utility for the fund manager.
For simplicity, we assume u(0) = 0. Moreover, we assume that m is absolutely
continuous. (Otherwise we could approximate m by a sequence of absolutely contin-
uous measures.) Let ε ≥ 0 and define
Rpε(x) :=
{
x − ε + δ, x < m0,
x + ε + δ, x ≥ m0,
where m0 is defined by
∫ m0
−∞ dm(x) =
∫ +∞
m0
dm(x) = 12 , and δ > 0 is given by the
no-arbitrage condition and will be computed below. (δ is in some sense the “risk
premium” that we get for taking the additional risk expressed by ε.) Let pε be the
joint probability measure induced by Rpε . Then its mean value is
E(pε) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Rpε(x) dm(x)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(x + δ) dm(x) + ε
∫ +∞
m0
dm(x) − ε
∫ m0
−∞
dm(x) = E(m) + δ.
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Therefore the covariance of the co-monotone joint probability measure with margin-
als m and pε can be computed as
cov(pε,m) =
∫ m0
−∞
(
x − E(m))(x − ε + δ − E(pε)
)
dm(x)
+
∫ m0
−∞
(
x − E(m))(x + ε + δ − E(pε)
)
dm(x)
= var(m) +
∫ m0
−∞
(
x − E(m))(−ε + δ − E(pε) + E(m)
)
dm(x)
+
∫ m0
−∞
(
x − E(m))(ε + δ − E(pε) + E(m)
)
dm(x).
We insert this and the formula for E(pε) into the no-arbitrage condition and obtain
E(m) + δ − R = (E(m) − R)
(
1 + 1
var(m)
∫ m0
−∞
−(x − E(m))ε dm(x)
+ 1
var(m)
∫ m0
−∞
(
x − E(m))ε dm(x)
)
= E(m) − R
var(m)
(
var(m) +
∫ m0
−∞
x dm(x) −
∫ +∞
m0
x dm(x)
)
ε.
We can resolve this to obtain a formula for δ, namely
δ(ε) = E(m) − R
var(m)
(∫ m0
−∞
x dm(x) −
∫ +∞
m0
x dm(x)
)
ε.
We see from this that δ(0) = 0 and δ′(0) > 0. We use a Taylor expansion to compute
the utility difference of p and pε:
U(pε) − U(p) = 12u(δ − ε) +
1
2
u(δ + ε)
= u′(0)δ(ε) + O((δ(ε) − ε)2, (δ(ε) + ε)2)
= u′(0)(δ′(0)ε) + O(ε2).
Therefore, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, this difference is positive, i.e., U(pε) > U(p),
which shows that p defined by Rp(x) = x cannot be optimal. 
We want to stress that a crucial condition for the derivation of this result was the
differentiability of u at zero. If we replace the utility function u by a value function
that has a kink at zero (“loss aversion”) as suggested, e.g., by Kahneman and Tver-
sky [18], our result does not apply, and it is conceivable that an investor would indeed
stick exactly to the market portfolio.
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2.6 Asset baskets and factor pricing
So far we have studied purely one-dimensional problems. Many structured products,
however, give payments according to the payoff of several underlyings. Can we de-
scribe such products within our framework?
It is useful to put this question into a more general setup and to connect it with
the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) introduced by Ross [27]. This model extends the
CAPM in that it takes more than one potential risk factor into account. Factors can
be, e.g., the stock market price development and also changes in the interest rate,
the GDP, etc. The price of an asset p is then approximated by a sum of the linear
contributions of all these factors, i.e.,
p = E(p) +
F∑
f=1
βp,rf rf ,
where F is the number of factors, rf is the return of the factor f , and βp,rf is the
sensitivity of p to the factor f . Using a linear regression to estimate the β-terms, one
obtains
βp,rf =
cov(p, rf )
var(rf )
,
and the CAPM can be found as a special case for F = 1 where r1 is the market return.
See [21, Chap. 20] and [6, Chap. J] for further details and a derivation of the APT.
If we have a structured product whose payment depends on more than one under-
lying, we arrive at the same formula, where rf denotes the returns of the F under-
lyings instead of the factor returns. Can we derive a co-monotonicity result in this
framework? In fact we can obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.24 (Co-monotonicity with several factors or underlyings) If asset
prices are given by a factor model or depend on several underlyings, an optimal
structured product is co-monotone with the weighted sum of the factors. More pre-
cisely, if the factor returns are given by rf , then the optimal product is co-monotone
with
∑F
f=1 df rf , where we write df := (E(rf ) − R)/var(rf ).
Proof The key idea is to evoke the multidimensional Theorem 2.7 with m = F ≥ 1,
n = 1, and
c(x, y) :=
F∑
f=1
E(rf ) − R
var(rf )
(
y − E(p))(x − E(rf )
)
,
where x = (x1, . . . , xF ) ∈ RF . Here we use that
F∑
f=1
E(rf ) − R
var(rf )
∫
RF
∫
R
(
y − E(p))(x − E(rf )
)
dTf (x, y)
=
∫
RF
∫
R
F∑
f=1
E(rf ) − R
var(rf )
(
y − E(p))(x − E(rf )
)
dT (x, y)
Co-monotonicity of optimal investments 43
with Tf denoting the projection of T on the (xf , y)-plane. By Theorem 2.7 an opti-
mal joint probability measure for the corresponding transport problem is c-monotone.
Using the same computation as in the one-dimensional case, we see that it is also
c˜-monotone with
c˜(x, y) :=
F∑
f=1
df xy.
It follows that for (xa, ya) and (xb, yb) ∈ suppT , we have
c˜
(
xa, ya
) + c˜(xb, yb) ≤ c˜(xa, yb) + c˜(xb, ya).
Inserting the definition of c˜, we obtain
(
F∑
f=1
df
(
xaf − xbf
)
)
(
ya − yb) ≥ 0,
which implies the co-monotonicity of p with respect to
∑F
f=1 df rf . 
There is of course no co-monotonicity with the single factors, since the factors are
not perfectly correlated.
A limitation of the above result is that the factors df are difficult to estimate. Nev-
ertheless, there are many payoff profiles that can be immediately discarded as nonop-
timal, regardless of the precise value of the weighting factors df . Examples for this
include all worst-off structures where (at least in some scenarios) the payoff depends
entirely on the underlying with the lowest return, since this would give a weight of
zero to all other underlyings. Similarly, separate capital protection for each underly-
ing (i.e., a payoff of the form ∑f max(1, grf ) where g < 1 is the participation rate
in gains) cannot be optimal.
3 Designing optimal financial products
Applying the results of the previous section, we can introduce a new method for
portfolio optimization. The co-monotonicity makes our task of finding optimal in-
vestments a lot easier, since co-monotone joint probability measures with given mar-
ginals are unique. Therefore, it is sufficient to optimize the return distribution p,
assuming that the joint probability measure T is the unique co-monotone joint prob-
ability measure with marginals p and π˜ . We are therefore only left with maximizing
utility over all probability measures that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. We outline
in Sect. 3.2 how this could be done numerically, but before that, in Sect. 3.1, we study
existence and some properties of solutions for the resulting optimization problem. In
Sect. 3.3 we finally consider some cases where existence fails.
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3.1 Existence of optimal financial products
In this section, we mainly deal for simplicity with rational investors in the sense
of [28], i.e., we assume that the utility U can be expressed by
U(T ) =
∫ ∞
0
u(x)d(pr2T )(x) =
∫ ∞
0
u(x)dp(x),
where x is the final wealth of the investor who invests in a product with the return p,
and u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. We assume that u is continu-
ous and increasing.
From now on, we implicitly assume that, for given p and π , T is the joint prob-
ability measure with marginals p and π˜ which is co-monotone with π˜ . Thus we can
define the maximum covariance between p and π˜ as
mcov(p, π˜) := covT .
Our optimization problem can now be stated as finding p ∈ P that maximizes
U(p) :=
∫ ∞
0
u(x)dp(x)
subject to
E(p) − R = mcov(p, π˜)
var(π˜)
(
E(π˜) − R). (3.1)
We formulate the following existence result.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of optimal financial products) Let the preferences of the
investor be given by expected utility theory with utility function u. Assume that u is
continuous, increasing, and of sublinear growth, i.e., that u(x)/x → 0 as x → ∞.
Assume furthermore that the state price density π˜ vanishes outside an interval [0,M]
and that var(π˜) > M(E(π˜)−R). Then there exists an optimal financial product, i.e.,
the above problem admits a maximizer p ∈ P . Moreover, E(p) < ∞.
We shall see in Sect. 3.3 that some of the conditions made in this theorem are not
purely technical but indeed necessary.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 The proof consists of the following steps:
1. There is a constant C > 0 such that all p ∈ P that satisfy (3.1) have a finite ex-
pected value E(p) ≤ C.
2. For every sequence (pn) satisfying (3.1), there exists a p ∈ P such that a subse-
quence (pn′) of (pn) converges weakly- to p, i.e., pn′

⇀ p.
3. The supremum of U(p) over all p ∈ P that satisfy (3.1) is finite.
4. The maximization problem admits a maximizer.
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Step 1: First, we use the approximation result in Lemma 2.9 and assume therefore
without loss of generality that all joint probability measures can be expressed by
functions. We denote the function corresponding to a return p by Rp . We observe the
useful identity
mcov(p, π˜) =
∫ ∞
0
(
x − E(π˜))(Rp(x) − E(p)
)
dπ(x)
=
∫ ∞
0
xRp(x)dπ(x) − E(π˜).
To simplify notation, we write σ 2 := var(π˜). Let p ∈ P and assume that p satisfies
the no-arbitrage condition (3.1). To obtain an estimate on E(p) using the estimate on
the support of π˜ , we write
E(p) = R + mcov(p, π˜)
σ 2
(
E(π˜) − R)
= R +
∫ ∞
0 xRp(x)dπ(x) − E(π˜)
σ 2
(
E(π˜) − R)
≤ R + ME(p) − E(π˜)σ 2(E(π˜) − R).
Resolving this while using the assumption σ 2 = var(π) > M(E(π˜) − R), we get
E(p) ≤ R −
E(π˜)
σ 2
(E(π˜) − R)
1 − M
σ 2
< ∞, (3.2)
thus arriving at the desired uniform bound for p.
Step 2: Let (pn) be a sequence of probability measures satisfying (3.1). We want to
prove that we can select a subsequence (pn′) which is converging weakly- to a prob-
ability measure p. By Prokhorov’s theorem, it is sufficient to prove that (pn) is tight,
i.e., that for all η > 0, there is a compact subset Kη of R+ such that pn(Kη) > 1 − η.
Suppose that (pn) is not tight. Then for all L > 0, there exists an n0(L) ∈ N such
that pn0(L)((L,+∞)) > η0. Our strategy is now to estimate mcov(pn, π˜) from be-
low to show that under this assumption, it must diverge. This then implies via the
no-arbitrage condition (3.1) that also E(pn) diverges, in contradiction to the uniform
bound we have derived in Step 1.
So define M1,M2 such that (x − E(π˜)(Rpn(x) − E(pn)) =: h(x) is positive on
(0,M1) and (M2,M) and negative on (M1,M2). This is possible since x − E(π˜)
and Rpn(x) − E(pn) are nondecreasing functions with sign changes in E(π˜) and
r := R−1pn (E(pn)), respectively. Then we write
mcov(pn, π˜) =
∫ M
0
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
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=
∫ M1
0
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
+
∫ M2
M1
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
+
∫ M
M2
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
=: I0 + I1 + I2.
We have to distinguish two cases, depending on whether or not r ≥ E(π˜).
Case A: r ≥ E(π˜), i.e., M1 = E(π˜), M2 = r . In this case, we have
I0 + I1 ≥
∫ M1
0
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn
(
E(π˜)
) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
+
∫ M2
M1
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn
(
E(π˜)
) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x) ≥ 0.
Now we use the assumption that (pn) is not tight. It implies that, for all L > Rpn(r)
and n ≥ n0(L),
I2 =
∫ M
M2
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
≥
∫ M
R−1pn (L)
(
Rpn(L) − E(π˜)
)(
L − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
≥
∫ M
R−1pn (L)
(
R−1pn0(L) (L) − E(π˜)
)(
L − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
= pn0(L)
(
(L,+∞))(R−1pn0(L) (L) − E(π˜)
)(
L − E(pn)
)
> const.
(
L − E(pn)
) → +∞ as L → ∞.
Taking both estimates together, we have proved in this case that mcov(pn,m) → +∞
as n → ∞.
Case B: r < E(π˜), i.e., M1 = r , M2 = E(π˜). We decompose the maximum co-
variance analogously to case A and estimate
I0 + I1 =
∫ r
0
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
+
∫
E(π˜)
r
(
x − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
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≥
∫ r
0
(
r − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
+
∫
E(π˜)
r
(
r − E(π˜))(Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)
dπ(x)
= (r − E(π˜))
(∫
E(π˜)
0
Rpn(x) dπ(x) − E(pn)
∫
E(π˜)
0
dπ(x)
)
,
which is positive since Rpn is nondecreasing, E(pn) =
∫ M
0 Rpn(x) dπ(x), and hence∫
E(π˜)
0 Rpn(x) dπ(x) ≤ E(pn)
∫
E(π˜)
0 dπ(x). For I2, we can now use essentially the
same estimate as in Step A, which proves that also in this case mcov(pn, π˜) → ∞ as
n → ∞.
From the no-arbitrage condition (3.1) we immediately see that because
mcov(pn, π˜) → ∞, also E(pn) → ∞ as n → ∞, which contradicts the uniform
bound of E(pn) in (3.2). Therefore (pn) is tight, and we can apply Prokhorov’s the-
orem to obtain the existence of a weak- limit p ∈ P for a subsequence of (pn).
Step 3: We denote the concave envelope of the utility function u by uc. For every
p ∈ P which satisfies (3.1) and therefore also (3.2), we estimate with the help of
Jensen’s inequality that
U(p) ≤
∫ ∞
0
uc(x) dp(x) ≤ uc(E(p)) ≤ uc
(
R − E(π˜)
σ 2
(E(π˜) − R)
1 − M
σ 2
)
< +∞.
Due to this uniform bound, we can find a maximizing sequence (pn) of probability
measures satisfying (3.1), and using the results of Step 2, we can extract a subse-
quence that converges weakly- to a limit p ∈ P . It remains to prove that this limit
is indeed a solution of our maximization problem. In the remaining part of the proof,
we write, for simplicity, (pn) for the subsequence (pn′) of (pn).
Step 4: Here we use the sublinear growth of u and estimate, for any L > 0, that
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ ∞
0
u(x)dp −
∫ ∞
0
u(x)dpn
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ L
0
u(x)dp −
∫ L
0
u(x)dpn
∣
∣
∣
∣
+
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ ∞
L
u(x)
x
x dp −
∫ ∞
L
u(x)
x
x dpn
∣
∣
∣
∣.
While the first term converges to zero as n → ∞ since pn ⇀ p, the second can be
estimated by
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ ∞
L
u(x)
x
x dp −
∫ ∞
L
u(x)
x
x dpn
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤
u(L)
L
∫ ∞
L
x d(p − pn)
≤ u(L)
L
∣
∣E(p) − E(pn)
∣
∣.
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Using again estimate (3.2), the last term is bounded in n. If we consider the limit
L → ∞, this expression becomes arbitrarily small; therefore, using an appropriate
sequence of L = L(n), we have proved that U(pn) → U(p).
It only remains to prove that p satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (3.1). We first
show that
E(p) ≤ R + mcov(π˜ ,m)
σ 2
(
E(π˜) − R). (3.3)
To this end, we use the no-arbitrage condition for pn and (3.2) and estimate, for any
sufficiently small ε > 0, that
E(p) = E(p) − E(pn) + E(pn)
=
∫ M
0
(
Rp(x) − Rpn(x)
)
dπ + R
+ E(π˜) − R
σ 2
(∫ M−ε
0
(
Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)(
x − E(π˜))dπ
+
∫ M
M−ε
(
Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)(
x − E(π˜))dπ
)
≤
∫ M−ε
0
(
Rp(x) − Rpn(x)
)
dπ + R
+ E(π˜) − R
σ 2
∫ M−ε
0
(
Rpn(x) − E(pn)
)(
x − E(π˜))dπ
+
∫ M
M−ε
(
Rp(x) − Rpn(x)
)
dπ +
∫ M
M−ε
(
Rpn(x) − E(pn)x
)
dπ.
Since E(pn) is uniformly bounded, it converges, at least for a subsequence, to some
constant K . We can therefore pass to the limit as n → ∞ and obtain
E(p) ≤
∫ M
M−ε
Rp(x) dπ + R + E(π˜) − R
σ 2
(∫ M−ε
0
(
Rp(x)
(
x − E(π˜)))dπ
− K
∫ M−ε
0
(
x − E(π˜))dπ
)
+ K
∫ M
M−ε
dπ.
We apply the identity
∫ M
M−ε
(
x − E(π˜))dπ = −
∫ M−ε
0
(
x − E(π˜))dπ
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to derive
E(p) ≤
∫ M
M−ε
Rp(x) dπ + R + E(π˜) − R
σ 2
∫ M−ε
0
(
Rp(x)
(
x − E(π˜)))dπ
+ K E(π˜) − R
σ 2
∫ M
M−ε
(
x − E(π˜))dπ + K
∫ M
M−ε
dπ.
This inequality holds for all sufficiently small ε > 0. We can therefore pass to the
limit and obtain (3.3).
Now let us suppose that this inequality were strict. Then we could improve p by
adding a certain outcome for sure while at the same time satisfying the no-arbitrage
condition (3.1) exactly. (We have seen in the proof of Theorem 2.12 how to do this.)
This improved product p′ would by assumption have a larger utility than p, i.e.,
U(p′) > U(p); but U(pn) → U(p) as n → ∞ and (pn) was defined as a maximizing
sequence for U . Therefore inequality (3.3) must in fact be an equality, and (3.1) holds
for p.
Thus p is indeed a solution of our maximization problem, and we have proved the
existence result. 
It is also possible to characterize some features of solutions. In particular, we have
the following result.
Proposition 3.2 If u′(x) → 0 as x → ∞ and π˜ satisfies the assumptions from The-
orem 3.1, then an optimal financial product has a finite maximum return, i.e., supp p
is bounded.
Proof Assuming that there exists an optimal p ∈ P with unbounded support and
which can be represented by a function Rp , we define, for ε > 0,
Rp′(x) :=
{
Rp(x) + δ for x ∈ (0,M − ε),
Rp(x) − ε for x ∈ (M − ε,M),
where δ is chosen such that p′ satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (3.1). We de-
fine κ := ∫ M
M−ε dπ(x). A lengthy but straightforward computation shows then that
δ = O(εκ) and that
U(p′) − U(p) ≥ u′(E(π˜))(1 − κ)δ − u′(Rp(M − ε)
)
κε + O(ε2κ).
This is positive if ε > 0 is chosen small enough, since in this case Rp(M −ε) → +∞
and therefore u′(Rp(M − ε)) → 0. Thus p cannot be optimal. 
What kind of problems may arise for the existence result if one replaces expected
utility theory by prospect theory? One main difference is the probability weighting
that will overweight extreme small probability events. This might compensate for
the diminishing marginal utility of large outcomes. It is, e.g., possible to construct a
p ∈ P with finite expected value but infinite PT-utility. This phenomenon is essen-
tially a new variant of the St. Petersburg paradox; compare [26] for details.
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3.2 Numerical approximation
In order to compute optimal financial products numerically, the existence proof of
the previous section can give some rough guidance: The main idea is to optimize
in p rather than in T and to compute T for every given p and π˜ as the unique co-
monotone joint probability measure with marginals p and π˜ . This approach is much
more efficient than an optimization in T , since the number of necessary variables for
an approximation is much smaller, as we shall see in a moment.
We formulate this method for the case of finitely many states, since in a numerical
approximation T would be replaced by a matrix, and p and π˜ would be approximated
by vectors. This corresponds mathematically to approximating p and π˜ by sums of
weighted Dirac measures. Let x1, . . . , xN be the set of possible outcomes, where
x1 < x2 < · · · < xN . We want to find the optimal vector (p1, . . . , pN) of probabilities
for these outcomes, where pi ≥ 0, such that
(i) The total probability is one: p1 + · · · + pN = 1.
(ii) The probability measure p = ∑Ni=1 piδxi maximizes (among all probability mea-
sures of this form) a given utility U(p) subject to the constraint implied by (3.2).
It is now clear why our approach is more efficient than a direct optimization of
T : If we approximate p and π˜ each by N weighted Dirac measures, then T is an
N × N -matrix. A direct optimization of T would therefore be an optimization in N2
rather than in N variables.
However, we also have to compute the co-monotone T (or at least its covariance),
given its marginals p and π˜ , in an efficient way to make this idea work. Such an
algorithm could be obtained from the construction of Theorem 2.7 by starting from
an arbitrary joint probability measure with given marginals. It is, however, possible
to compute the covariance of the co-monotone joint probability measure directly and
at the same time more efficiently by applying a simple algorithm used by [25] in the
context of transport plans. For that, set i = j = 1, L = π˜1, and C = 0. Then, as long
as i ≤ n or j ≤ N , do the following:
– If L > pj , then set L = L − pj , C = C + pj (xi − E(p))(xj − E(π˜)).
– If L ≤ pj , then set L = 0, C = C + L(xi − E(p))(xj − E(π˜)).
– If L = 0, then set i = i + 1, L = π˜i , otherwise set j = j + 1.
This algorithm terminates since
∑N
i=1 π˜i = 1 =
∑N
j=1 pj . The variable C returns the
maximum covariance of p and π˜ , i.e., C = mcov(p, π˜).
Using this algorithm, the constraint (3.1) can be realized without explicitly know-
ing the joint probability measure T . The resulting finite constrained maximization
problem can be solved with standard algorithms for nonconcave maximization. This
rough sketch of ideas should be sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of solving
this optimization problem also in a practical application, but naturally there are still
interesting open questions, e.g., regarding the quality of convergence of this approx-
imation.
3.3 Potential nonexistence
In this section we come briefly back to the existence theorem of Sect. 3.1 and sketch
an example that demonstrates how one could get nonexistence in certain situations.
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The source of potential problems is most easily seen when relaxing the constraint of
positive final wealth (i.e., optimizing in P(R) rather than in P(R+)). For simplicity,
we set
π˜ := 1
2
δ−1 + 12δ2, R = 0.
In this case, we can construct a sequence of probability measures
pn := 12δ−n+c(n) +
1
2
δn+c(n),
where c(n) is chosen such that pn satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (3.1). Based
on this condition and using that E(pn) = c(n), E(π˜) = 1/2, var(π˜) = 3/2, and that
R = 0, we compute
c(n) = mcov(pn, π˜)
var(π˜)
E(π˜)
= 1
3
((−n + c(n) − c(n))(−3/2) + (n + c(n) − c(n))(3/2))
= n.
Therefore, if u is unbounded, U(pn) → +∞ as n → ∞, and we have obvi-
ously nonexistence. But even if u is bounded, but strictly increasing, U(pn) is
strictly increasing as n → ∞, but (pn) converges weakly- to p := 12δ0; thus
U(p) < limn→∞ U(pn). Hence also in this case, an existence proof is not possible.
We see that the fundamental problem is that mcov(pn, π˜) and E(pn) simultane-
ously tend to infinity. This problematic phenomenon that can, as we have just seen,
lead to nonexistence can only be excluded under additional conditions like those we
introduced in our existence result. It is an interesting question for future work to what
extent these conditions can be relaxed.
4 Applications to bonus certificates
In this section we want to have a look at a specific type of structured products with
co-monotone payoffs, bonus certificates. In their simplest form, they are an invest-
ment in a certain underlying that guarantees capital protection as long as the price
of the underlying does not fall below a certain threshold, the “barrier level.” Once
the underlying is below the threshold, the capital protection is gone and is also not
recovered by future increases above the barrier level. The payoff diagram of such a
product at maturity is schematically illustrated in Fig. 1. Such bonus certificates are
nowadays routinely sold by banks (in particular in Europe) to private clients who
want to invest on the stock market but, at the same time, want to minimize their ex-
posure to potential losses. Such private investors typically do not have background
risk to be hedged by this product, nor could one convincingly argue that they have
an information advantage that would allow them to profit from speculation. Thus our
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Fig. 1 Payoff diagram of a
bonus certificate
two assumptions are most likely satisfied: The clients have no background risk, and
they have homogeneous beliefs.
The joint probability distribution of these products, however, is obviously not co-
monotone, since its support contains the whole diagonal and also parts of the x-axis
of the above diagram. Therefore, independently of the stochastic process of the un-
derlying, the product is not optimal, neither regarding the zero reference point nor
the reference point of the underlying (compare Propositions 2.19 and 2.21 or Corol-
lary 2.8). In fact, we can compute analytically the “optimized” variant of this product
that has the same return distribution but lower hedging costs.
Proposition 4.1 (Monotonized bonus certificate) Let T ∈ P(R2) be the joint proba-
bility measure of the market return m ∈ P and the return p ∈ P of the bonus certifi-
cate at maturity. Assume for simplicity that m is absolutely continuous. Let B be the
barrier level. Let Rp be defined by
Rp(x) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 for x ∈ [x0,0],
P−1(M(x)) for x ∈ [B,x0),
x otherwise,
where we set x0 := sup{x ∈ R |m([x0,0]) ≥ T ([B,0) × {0})}, P(x) := p((−∞, x]),
and M(x) := m((−∞, x]). Then the alternative product Topt := (Id × Rp)#m that
yields the payoff Rp(x) when the market return is x generates the same return p, i.e.,
pr2(Topt) = p, but has a lower price.
Proof We need to verify that pr2(Topt) = p. It is clear that
(
pr2(Topt)
)({0}) = m([x0,0]
) = T ([B,0] × {0}) = p({0}).
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Fig. 2 Payoff diagram of the
optimized product, yielding the
same return distribution for a
lower price
Hence, we only need to check the condition for y ∈ (B,0). There, we have
(
pr2(Topt)
)
(y) = m(R
−1
p (y))
R′p(R−1p (y))
.
We compute
R′p(x) =
d
dx
(
P−1
(
M(x)
)) = (P−1)′(M(x))m(x),
and thus
(
pr2(Topt)
)
(y) = m(R
−1
p (y))
(P−1)′(M(R−1p (y))) m(R−1p (y))
.
Now since (P−1)′ = 1/P ′(P−1) and P−1(M(x)) = Rp(x), this simplifies to
(
pr2(Topt)
)
(y) = P ′(P−1(M(R−1p (y)
))
) = p(y).
Since Topt is co-monotone by construction (Rp is nondecreasing) and T is not co-
monotone (as we have seen), but U(Topt) = U(p) = U(T ), we can apply Proposi-
tion 2.19 to see that T cannot be optimal. 
The optimized product (see Fig. 2) yields precisely the same return distribution
for the customer but will be cheaper to hedge for the bank. (There is no arbitrage op-
portunity here, since the optimized product will yield a lower return in some states!)
In fact, this analysis shows that the success of products involving barriers cannot be
explained without considering behavioral biases as has been pointed out in [13].
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5 Conclusions
We have seen that every optimal financial product is co-monotone with the reversed
state price density. This holds regardless of the preferences under consideration, as
long as the investor only considers absolute returns of his investment or if he mea-
sures performance relative to an index which is a nondecreasing function of the re-
versed state price density.
In the special case of a market that can (at least to some extent) be described
by the Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Black–Scholes model, this implies that
optimal portfolios for an investor who is only interested in the absolute returns of his
portfolio “follow the market,” i.e., their return is the better, the better the return of the
market portfolio. This monotonicity also holds for an investor who is only interested
in relative performance with respect to the market return. Again, in both instances
the underlying decision model can be chosen arbitrarily (e.g., expected utility theory,
mean–variance or prospect theory). Moreover, we have shown that for an investor
whose utility solely depends on the relative return of his investment, only financial
products that are at least as risky as the market portfolio can be optimal. In the case of
a smooth, concave von Neumann–Morgenstern utility investor, an optimal investment
even has to be riskier than the market portfolio.
The fundamental assumptions of these results were homogeneous beliefs and no
background risk. Moreover we assumed complete and arbitrage-free markets. The
assumptions on the investor’s preferences were, however, very weak. In this way, we
have extended previous work by Dybvig [9] in several directions: allowing for arbi-
trary state spaces (as Föllmer and Schied and also Jouini and Porte did already for
(strictly) concave utility functions in [11, 17]), general probability measures (includ-
ing nonabsolutely continuous ones), general preferences, and even preferences that
are depending on the relative performance with respect to a benchmark (e.g., the state
price density or the market return). This shows in particular that optimal products can
be described (essentially) by a simple increasing payoff function which makes it eas-
ier to study optimal structured products, see [13].
An extension of this co-monotonicity result to several underlyings (or factor mod-
els, like APT) is possible. The optimal product is then co-monotone with a weighted
sum of the underlyings (or factors).
We studied a new method for the construction of optimal financial products, based
on the idea of finding the optimal return distribution among all probability measures
satisfying the no-arbitrage condition. This approach makes it necessary to study ex-
istence of optimal financial products. We proved an existence result using ideas from
the calculus of variations and outlined a numerical algorithm for obtaining optimal
financial products based on the investor’s preferences. Some remarks on situations
where existence fails underline the role of some of the assumptions in the existence
theorem.
Another application was in the context of bonus certificates. Under the simpli-
fying assumption of a CAPM market or the Black–Scholes model, we could show
that bonus certificates cannot be optimal and can be optimized analytically to reduce
hedging costs.
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